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Abstract
Assume that two distant parties, Alice and Bob, as well as an adversary, Eve, have access
to (quantum) systems prepared jointly according to a tripartite state ρABE. In addition,
Alice and Bob can use local operations and authenticated public classical communication.
Their goal is to establish a key which is unknown to Eve. We initiate the study of this
scenario as a unification of two standard scenarios: (i) key distillation (agreement) from
classical correlations and (ii) key distillation from pure tripartite quantum states.
Firstly, we obtain generalisations of fundamental results related to scenarios (i) and (ii),
including upper bounds on the key rate, i.e., the number of key bits that can be extracted
per copy of ρABE . Moreover, based on an embedding of classical distributions into quantum
states, we are able to find new connections between protocols and quantities in the standard
scenarios (i) and (ii).
Secondly, we study specific properties of key distillation protocols. In particular, we show
that every protocol that makes use of pre-shared key can be transformed into an equally
efficient protocol which needs no pre-shared key. This result is of practical significance as
it applies to quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, but it also implies that the key
rate cannot be locked with information on Eve’s side. Finally, we exhibit an arbitrarily large
separation between the key rate in the standard setting where Eve is equipped with quantum
memory and the key rate in a setting where Eve is only given classical memory. This shows
that assumptions on the nature of Eve’s memory are important in order to determine the
correct security threshold in QKD.
1 Introduction
Many cryptographic tasks such as message encryption or authentication rely on secret keys,1 i.e.,
random strings only known to a restricted set of parties. In information-theoretic cryptography,
where no assumptions on the adversary’s resources2 are made, distributing keys between distant
parties is impossible if only public classical communication channels are available [1, 2]. However,
this situation changes dramatically if the parties have access to additional devices such as noisy
channels (where also a wiretapper is subject to noise), a noisy source of randomness, a quantum
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channel, or a pre-shared quantum state. As shown in [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], these devices allow the secure
distribution of keys.3
This work is concerned with information-theoretic key distillation from pre-distributed noisy
data. More precisely, we consider a situation where two distant parties, Alice and Bob, have access
to (not necessarily perfectly) correlated pieces of (classical or quantum) information, which might
be partially known to an adversary, Eve. The goal of Alice and Bob is to distill virtually perfect
key bits from these data, using only an authentic (but otherwise insecure) classical communication
channel.
Generally speaking, key distillation is possible whenever Alice and Bob’s data are sufficiently
correlated and, at the same time, Eve’s uncertainty on these data is sufficiently large. It is one
of the goals of this paper to exhibit the properties pre-shared data must have in order to allow
key distillation.
In practical applications, the pre-distributed data might be obtained from realistic physical
devices such as noisy (classical or quantum) channels or other sources of randomness. Eve’s
uncertainty on Alice and Bob’s data might then be imposed by inevitable noise in the devices
due to thermodynamic or quantum effects.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be seen as a special case of key distillation where the
pre-shared data is generated using a quantum channel. The laws of quantum physics imply that
the random values held by one party, say Alice, cannot at the same time be correlated with Bob
and Eve. Hence, whenever Alice and Bob’s values are strongly correlated (which can be checked
easily) then Eve’s uncertainty about them must inevitably (by the laws of quantum mechanics) be
large, hence, Alice and Bob can distil key. Because of this close relation between key distillation
and QKD, many of the results we give here will have direct implications to QKD.
Furthermore, the theory of key distillation has nice parallels with the theory of entanglement
distillation, where the goal is to distil maximally entangled states (also called singlets) from
(a sequence of) bipartite quantum states. In fact, the two scenarios have many properties in
common. For example, there is a gap between the key rate (i.e., the amount of key that can
be distilled from some given noisy data) and the key cost (the amount of key that is needed to
simulate the noisy data, using only public classical communication) [7]. This gap can be seen as
the classical analogue of a gap between distillable entanglement (the amount of singlets that can
be distilled from a given bipartite quantum state) and entanglement cost (the amount of singlets
needed to generate the state).
1.1 Related work
The first and basic instance of an information-theoretic key agreement scenario is Wyner’s wiretap
channel [8]. Here, Alice can send information via a noisy classical channel to Bob. Eve, the
eavesdropper, has access to a degraded version of Bob’s information. Wyner has calculated the
rate at which key generation is possible if only Alice is allowed to send public classical messages to
Bob. Wyner’s work has later been generalised by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, relaxing the restrictions on
the type of information given to Eve [3]. Based on these ideas, Maurer and Ahlswede and Csisza´r
have proposed an extended scenario where key is distilled from arbitrary correlated classical
information (specified by a tripartite probability distribution) [2, 4]. In particular, Maurer has
shown that two-way communication can lead to a strictly positive key rate even though the key
rate in the one-way communication scenario might be zero [2].
In parallel to this development quantum cryptography emerged: in 1984 Bennett and Brassard
devised a QKD scheme in which quantum channels could be employed in order to generate a secure
key without the need to put a restriction on the eavesdropper [5]. In 1991, Ekert discovered that
quantum cryptographic schemes could be based on entanglement, that is, on quantum correlations
3In certain scenarios, including the one studied in this paper, an authentic classical channel is needed in addition.
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that are strictly stronger than classical correlations [6]. Clearly, this is key distillation from
quantum information.
The first to spot a relation between the classical and the quantum development were Gisin
and Wolf; in analogy to bound entanglement in quantum information theory, they conjectured the
existence of bound information, namely classical correlation that can only be created from key
but from which no key can be distilled [9]. Their conjecture remains unsolved, but has stimulated
the community in search for an answer.
To derive lower bounds on the key rate, we will make repeated use of results by Devetak and
Winter, who derived a bound on the key rate if the tripartite quantum information consists of
many identical and mutually independent pieces, and by Renner and Ko¨nig, who derived privacy
amplification results which also hold if this independence condition is not satisfied [10, 11].
1.2 Contributions
We initiate the study of a unified key distillation scenario, which includes key distillation from
pre-shared classical and quantum data (Section 2). We then derive a variety of quantitative
statements related to this scenario. These unify and extend results from both the quantum and
classical world.
There are numerous upper bounds available in the specific scenarios and it is our aim to provide
the bigger picture that will put order into this zoo by employing the concept of a secrecy monotone,
i.e., a function that decreases under local operations and public communication (Section 3), as
introduced in [12]. The upper bounds can then roughly be subdivided into two categories: (i) the
ones based on classical key distillation [13] and (ii) the ones based on quantum communication
or entanglement measures [14].
The unified scenario that we develop does not stop at an evaluation of the key rate but
lets us investigate intricate connections between the two extremes. We challenge the viewpoint
of Gisin and Wolf who highlight the relation between key distillation from classical correlation
and entanglement distillation from this very correlation embedded into quantum states [9]: we
prove a theorem that relates key distillation from certain classical correlation and key (and not
entanglement) distillation from their embedded versions (Section 4). This ties in with recent work
which established that key distillation can be possible even from quantum states from which no
entanglement can be distilled [15].
A fruitful concept that permeates this work is the concept of locking of classical information
in quantum states : let Alice choose an n-bit string x = x1 . . . xn with uniform probability and
let her either send the state |x1〉 . . . |xn〉 or the state H⊗n|x1〉 . . . |xn〉 to Bob, where H is the
Hadamard transformation. Not knowing if the string is sent in the computational basis or in
the Hadamard basis, it turns out that the optimal measurement that Bob can do in order to
maximise the mutual information between the measurement outcome y and Alice’s string x is
with respect to a randomly chosen basis, in which case he will obtain I(X ;Y ) = n2 . If, however,
he has access to the single bit which determines the basis, he will have I(X ;Y ) = n. A single
bit can therefore unlock an arbitrary amount of information. This effect has been termed locking
of classical information in quantum states or simply locking and was first described in [16]. In
this paper, we will discuss various types of locking effects and highlight their significance for the
design and security of QKD protocols (Section 5).
Finally, we demonstrate that the amount of key that can be distilled from given pre-shared
data strongly depends on whether Eve is assumed to store her information in a classical or in a
quantum memory. This, again, has direct consequences for the analysis of protocols in quantum
cryptography (Section 6).
For a more detailed explanation of the contributions of this paper, we refer to the introductory
paragraphs of Sections 3–6.
3
2 The unified key distillation scenario
In classical information-theoretic cryptography one considers the problem of distilling key from
correlated data specified by a tripartite probability distribution pijk (pijk ≥ 0,
∑
i,j,k pijk =
1). Alice and Bob who wish to distil the key have access to i and j, respectively, whereas
the eavesdropper Eve knows the value k (see, e.g., [17]). Typically, it is assumed that many
independently generated copies of the triples (i, j, k) are available4. The key rate or distillable
key of a distribution pijk is the rate at which key bits can be obtained per realisation of this
distribution, if Alice and Bob are restricted to local operations and public but authentic classical
communication.
Before we continue to introduce the quantum version of the key distillation scenario described
above, let us quickly note that it will be convenient to regard probability distributions as classical
states, that is, given probabilities pi, we consider ρ =
∑d
i=1 pi|i〉〈i|, where |i〉 is an orthonormal
basis of a d-dimensional Hilbert space; we will assume that d <∞. In the sequel we will encounter
not only classical or quantum states, but also states that are distributed over several systems
which might be partly classical and partly quantum-mechanical. To make this explicit, we say
that a bipartite state ρAB is cq (classical-quantum) if it is of the form ρAB =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i|A ⊗ ρiB
for quantum states ρiB and a probability distribution pi. This definition easily extends to three
or more parties, for instance:
• a ccq (classical-classical-quantum) state ρABE is of the form
∑
i,j pij |i〉〈i|A ⊗ |j〉〈j|B ⊗ ρijE ,
where pij is a probability distribution and ρ
ij
E are arbitrary quantum states.
• the probability distribution pijk corresponds to a ccc (classical-classical-classical) state
ρABE =
∑
i,j,k pijk|ijk〉〈ijk|ABE, where we use |ijk〉ABE as a short form for |i〉A⊗|j〉B⊗|k〉E
(as above, the states |i〉A for different values of i, and likewise |j〉B and |k〉k, are normalised
and mutually orthogonal).
We will be concerned with key distillation from arbitrary tripartite quantum states ρABE
shared by Alice, Bob, and an adversary Eve, assisted by local quantum operations and public
classical communication (LOPC) [10, 19, 15]. A local quantum operation on Bob’s side is of the
form
ρABE 7→ (IAE ⊗ ΛB)(ρABE) . (1)
Public classical communication from Alice to Bob can be modelled by copying a local classical
register, i.e., any state of the form ρAA′BE =
∑
i ρ
i
ABE⊗|i〉〈i|A′ is transformed into ρ′AA′BB′EE′ =∑
i ρ
i
ABE ⊗ |iii〉〈iii|A′B′E′ . Similarly, one can define these operations with the roles of Alice and
Bob interchanged.
The goal of a key distillation protocol is to transform copies of tripartite states ρABE into a
state which is close to
τ ℓABE =
1
2ℓ
2ℓ∑
i=1
|ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ τE (2)
for some arbitrary τE . τ
ℓ
ABE (also denoted τ
ℓ for short) corresponds to a perfect key of length ℓ,
i.e., uniform randomness on an alphabet of size 2ℓ shared by Alice and Bob and independent of
Eve’s system. We measure closeness of two states ρ and σ in terms of the trace norm ‖ρ− σ‖ :=
1
2Tr|ρ− σ|. The trace norm is the natural quantum analogue of the variational distance to which
it reduces if ρ and σ are classical.
We will now give the formal definition of an LOPC protocol and of the key rate.
4Using de Finetti’s representation theorem, this assumption can be weakened to the assumption that the overall
distribution of all triples is invariant under permutations (see [18] for more details including a treatment of the
quantum case).
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Definition 2.1. An LOPC protocol P is a family {Λn}n∈N of completely positive trace preserving
(CPTP) maps
Λn : (HA ⊗HB ⊗HE)⊗n → HnA ⊗HnB ⊗HnE (3)
which are defined by the concatenation of a finite number of local operation and public communi-
cation steps.
Definition 2.2. We say that an LOPC protocol P distills key at rate RP if there exists a sequence
{ℓn}n∈N such that
lim sup
n→∞
ℓn
n
= RP (4)
lim
n→∞
‖Λn(ρ⊗nABE)− τ ℓnABE‖ = 0 (5)
where τ ℓnABE are the ccq states defined by (2). The key rate or distillable key of a state ρABE is
defined as KD(ρABE) := supP RP .
The quantity KD obviously depends on the partition of the state given as argument into the
three parts controlled by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. We thus indicate the assignment of
subsystems by semicolons if needed. For instance, we write ρAD;B;E if Alice holds an additional
system D.
As shown in Appendix A, the maximisation in the definition of KD can be restricted to
protocols whose communication complexity grows at most linearly in the number of copies of
ρABE . Hence, if d = dimHA ⊗HB ⊗HE <∞ then the dimension of the output of the protocol
is bounded by log dimHnA ⊗HnB ⊗HnE ≤ cn log d, for some constant c.
The above security criterion is (strictly) weaker than the one proposed in [10]5, henceKD(ρABE)
evaluated on cqq states is lower bounded by an expression derived in [10]:
KD(ρABE) ≥ I(A : B)ρ − I(A : E)ρ . (6)
This expression can be seen as a quantum analogue of the well-known bound of Csisza´r, Ko¨rner,
and Maurer [3, 17]. Here I(A : B)ρ denotes the mutual information defined by I(A : B)ρ :=
S(A)ρ + S(B)ρ − S(AB)ρ where S(A)ρ := S(ρA) is the von Neumann entropy of system A (and
similarly for B and E). For later reference we also define the conditional mutual information
I(A : B|E)ρ := S(AE)ρ + S(BE)ρ − S(ABE)ρ − S(E)ρ.
Note also that the criterion for the quality of the distilled key used in Definition 2.2 implies that
the key is both uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary’s knowledge, just as in [11].
Previous works considered uniformity and security separately. Note that, even though weaker
than certain alternative criteria such as the one of [10], the security measure of Definition 2.2 is
universally composable [11].
In [20], the question was posed whether the security condition also holds if the accessible
information is used instead of the criterion considered here. Recently, it has been shown that this
is not the case [21]. More precisely, an example of a family of states was exhibited such that Eve
has exponentially small knowledge in terms of accessible information but constant knowledge in
terms of the Holevo information. This implies that in this context, security definitions based on
the accessible information are problematic. In particular, a key might be insecure even though
the accessible information of an adversary on the key is exponentially small (in the key size).
5The security criterion of [10] implies that, conditioned on any value of the key, Eve’s state is almost the same.
In contrast, according to the above definition, Eve’s state might be arbitrary for a small number of values of the
key.
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3 Upper bounds for the key rate
In this section, we first derive sufficient conditions that a function has to satisfy in order to be an
upper bound for the key rate (Section 3.1). We focus on functions that are secrecy monotones [12],
i.e., they are monotonically decreasing under LOPC operations. Our approach therefore parallels
the situation in classical and quantum information theory where resource transformations are also
bounded by monotonic functions; examples include the proofs of converses to coding theorems
and entanglement measures (see, e.g., [14]). As a corollary to our characterisation of secrecy
monotones, we show how to turn entanglement monotones into secrecy monotones.
In a second part (Section 3.2), we provide a number of concrete secrecy monotones that satisfy
the conditions mentioned above. They can be roughly divided into two parts: (i) functions derived
from the intrinsic information and (ii) functions based on entanglement monotones. Finally, we
will compare different secrecy monotones (Section 3.3) and study a few particular cases in more
detail (Section 3.4).
3.1 Secrecy monotones
Theorem 3.1. Let M(ρ) be a function mapping tripartite quantum states ρ ≡ ρABE into the
positive numbers such that the following holds:
1. Monotonicity: M(Λ(ρ)) ≤M(ρ) for any LOPC operation Λ.
2. Asymptotic continuity: for any states ρn, σn on HnA⊗HnB⊗HnE, the condition ‖ρn−σn‖ → 0
implies 1log rn
∣∣M(ρn)−M(σn)∣∣→ 0 where rn = dim(HnA ⊗HnB ⊗HnE).
3. Normalisation: M(τ ℓ) = ℓ .
Then the regularisation of the function M given by M∞(ρ) = lim supn→∞
M(ρ⊗n)
n
is an upper
bound on KD, i.e., M
∞(ρABE) ≥ KD(ρABE) for all ρABE with dimHA ⊗HB ⊗HE <∞. If in
addition M satisfies
4. Subadditivity on tensor products: M(ρ⊗n) ≤ nM(ρ),
then M is an upper bound for KD.
Proof. Consider a key distillation protocol P that produces output states σn such that ‖σn −
τ ℓn‖ → 0. We will show that M∞(ρ) ≥ RP . Let us assume without loss of generality that
RP > 0. Indeed, by monotonicity we have M(ρ⊗n) ≥M(σn), which is equivalent to
1
n
M(ρ⊗n) ≥ ℓn
n
(
M(σn)−M(τ ℓn)
ℓn
+ 1
)
, (7)
where we have used the normalisation condition. As remarked in Definition 2.2 there is a constant
c > 0 such that log rn ≤ cn and by definition of RP there exists a c′ > 0 and n0 such that for all
n ≥ n0, log dn ≥ c′n. Hence ℓn ≥ c′n ≥ c′c log rn, therefore asymptotic continuity implies
lim
n→∞
1
ℓn
∣∣M(σn)−M(τ ℓn)∣∣ = 0 . (8)
Taking the limsup on both sides of (7) gives M∞(ρ) ≥ lim supn ℓnn = RP . Thus we have shown
that M∞ is an upper bound for the rate of an arbitrary protocol, so that it is an also upper
bound for KD.
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If we restrict our attention to the special case of key distillation from bipartite states ρAB,
we can immediately identify a well-known class of secrecy monotones, namely entanglement
monotones. A convenient formulation is in this case not given by the distillation of states
τ ℓ with help of LOPC operations, but rather by the distillation of states γℓ via local opera-
tions and classical communication (LOCC), where γℓ = U |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ℓAB ⊗ ρA′B′U †, for some unitary
U =
∑2ℓ
i=1 |ii〉〈ii|AB ⊗ U (i)A′B′ and |ψ〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉) [15, 22]. Note that measuring the state
γℓ with respect to the computational bases on Alice and Bob’s subsystems results in ℓ key bits.
Corollary 3.2. Let E(ρ) be a function mapping bipartite quantum states ρ ≡ ρAB into the
positive numbers such that the following holds:
1. Monotonicity: E(Λ(ρ)) ≤ E(ρ) for any LOCC operation Λ.
2. Asymptotic continuity: for any states ρn, σn on HnA ⊗ HnB, the condition ‖ρn − σn‖ → 0
implies 1log rn
∣∣E(ρn)− E(σn)∣∣→ 0 where rn = dim(HnA ⊗HnB).
3. Normalisation: E(γℓ) ≥ ℓ .
Then the regularisation of the function E given by E∞(ρ) = lim supn→∞
E(ρ⊗n)
n
is an upper
bound on KD, i.e., E
∞(ρAB) ≥ KD(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE) where |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE is a purification of ρAB. If in
addition E satisfies
4. Subadditivity on tensor products: E(ρ⊗n) ≤ nE(ρ),
then E is an upper bound for KD.
The analogue of this result in the realm of entanglement distillation has long been known:
namely, every function E satisfying LOCC monotonicity, asymptotic continuity near maximally
entangled states as well as normalisation on maximally entangled states (E(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = log d for
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
∑
i |ii〉) can be shown to provide an upper bound on distillable entanglement ED [23, 24],
that is, E∞(ρ) ≥ ED(ρ). Additionally, if E is subadditive, the same inequality holds with E∞
replaced by E. Indeed this result can be seen as a corollary to Corollary 3.2 by restricting from
distillation of states τ ℓ to distillation of |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ℓ and noting that |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗ℓ is of the form τ ℓ with
trivial A′B′.
In the above corollary, we have identified asymptotic continuity on all states as well as nor-
malisation on the states γℓ (rather than on singlets) as the crucial ingredients in order for an
entanglement measure to bound distillable key from above. Note also that we require those addi-
tional conditions as, for instance, the logarithmic negativity as defined in [25] satisfies the weaker
conditions, therefore being an upper bound on distillable entanglement, but fails to be an upper
bound on distillable key.
We will now show how to turn this bound for bipartite states (or tripartite pure states) into
one for arbitrary tripartite states. The recipe is simple: for a given state ρABE , consider a
purification |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E where the purifying system is denoted by A′B′ and is split between
Alice and Bob. Clearly, for any splitting, KD(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E) ≥ KD(ρABE). This inequality
combined with the previous corollary applied to |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E proves the following statement.
Corollary 3.3. If E satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.2 then
KD(ρABE) ≤ E∞(ρAA′BB′) , (9)
where ρAA′BB′ = TrE |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E and ρABE = TrA′B′ |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E. If E is subadditive, the
same inequality holds with E replacing E∞.
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3.2 Examples of secrecy monotones
We will now introduce a number of secrecy monotones. We will only briefly comment on the
relations between them. A more detailed analysis of how the different bounds on the key rate
compare is given in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Intrinsic information
The intrinsic information of a probability distribution pijk is given by
I(A : B ↓ E) := inf I(A : B|E′)ρ (10)
where ρABE is the ccc state corresponding to pijk. The infimum is taken over all channels from
E to E′ specified by a conditional probability distributions pl|m. ρABE′ is the state obtained by
applying the channel to E. This quantity has been defined by Maurer and Wolf and provides an
upper bound on the key rate from classical correlations [13]. We can extend it in the following
way to arbitrary tripartite quantum states ρABE .
Definition 3.4. The intrinsic information of a tripartite quantum state ρABE is given by
I(A : B ↓ E)ρ := inf I(A : B|E′)ρ (11)
where the infimum is taken over all CPTP maps ΛE→E from E to E′ where ρABE′ = (IAB ⊗
ΛE→E)(ρABE).
This definition is compatible with the original definition since it reduces to (10) if the systems
A, B and E are classical.
As shown in Appendix B, the intrinsic information satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1
and, hence, is an upper bound on the key rate.
Theorem 3.5. The intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e., KD(ρABE) ≤
I(A : B ↓ E)ρ.
Let us note that this bound differs from the bound proposed in [26, 19] where instead of all
quantum channels, arbitrary measurements were considered. Our present bound can be tighter,
as it can take into account Eve’s quantum memory.
In the case where ρABE is pure, this bound can be improved by a factor of two because
I(A : B ↓ E)ρ = 2Esq(ρAB), where Esq is the squashed entanglement defined below and because
squashed entanglement is an upper bound for the key rate.
3.2.2 Squashed entanglement
Definition 3.6. Squashed entanglement is defined as
Esq(ρAB) =
1
2
inf
ρABE :
ρAB=TrEρABE
I(A : B|E)ρ (12)
Squashed entanglement can be shown to be a LOCC monotone, additive [27], and asymptoti-
cally continuous [28]. In [29, Proposition 4.19] it was shown to satisfy the normalisation condition
and is therefore an upper bound on distillable key according to Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 3.7. Squashed entanglement is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e., KD(ρABE) ≤
Esq(ρAA′BB′) where ρAA′BB′ = TrE |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E and ρABE = TrA′B′ |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E.
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3.2.3 Reduced intrinsic information
There is another way in which we can find a bound on the key rate which is tighter than the
intrinsic information. In [7] it was shown that the classical intrinsic information is E-lockable,
i.e., it can increase sharply when a single bit is taken away from Eve. Since (classical) distillable
key is not E-lockable, the bound that the intrinsic information provides cannot be tight. This
was the motivation for defining the reduced intrinsic information by I(AB ↓↓ E) = inf I(AB ↓
EE′) + S(E′) where the infimum is taken over arbitrary classical values E′ [7]. We now define
the quantum extension of this function.
Definition 3.8. Let a = 1, 2. The reduced intrinsic information (with parameter a) is given by
I(A : B ↓↓ E)(a)ρ = inf{I(AB ↓ EE′)ρ + aS(E′)ρ} (13)
where the infimum is taken over all extensions ρABEE′ with a classical register E
′ if a = 1 and
over arbitrary extensions ρABEE′ if a = 2.
The parameter a reflects the different behaviour of the intrinsic information subject to loss of
a single bit (qubit). The reduced intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key since
KD(ρABE) ≤ KD(ρABEE′) + aS(E′) ≤ I(AB ↓ EE′) + aS(E′) . (14)
The first inequality corresponds to Corollary 5.2 below.
Theorem 3.9. The reduced intrinsic information is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e.,
KD(ρABE) ≤ I(A : B ↓↓ E)(a)ρ , for a = 1, 2.
3.2.4 Relative entropy of entanglement
The relative entropy of entanglement and its regularised version are well-known entanglement
measures that serve as important tools in entanglement theory.
Definition 3.10. The relative entropy of entanglement is given by [30, 31]
ER(ρAB) = inf
σAB
S(ρAB‖σAB) (15)
where S(ρAB‖σAB) = TrρAB[log ρAB − log σAB ] and the minimisation is taken over all separable
states σAB, i.e. σAB =
∑
i piρ
i
A ⊗ ρiB.
The relative entropy of entanglement was the first upper bound that has been provided for
KD(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE) [15, 22]. We now extend this result to all tripartite quantum states ρABE .
Theorem 3.11. The relative entropy of entanglement is an upper bound on distillable key, i.e.,
KD(ρABE) ≤ E∞R (ρAA′BB′) ≤ ER(ρAA′BB′) where ρAA′BB′ = TrE |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E and ρABE =
TrA′B′ |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′BB′E.
It is a particular advantage of ER in its function as an upper bound that it is not lockable [32].
3.3 Comparison of secrecy monotones
3.3.1 Pure versus mixed
For entangled states, bounds derived from entanglement measures are usually tighter than the
intrinsic information and its reduced version. Consider for example the state ρABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|AB⊗
ρE where |ψ〉AB = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉). Here we have
ER(ρABE) = E
∞
R (ρABE) = Esq(ρABE) = KD(ρABE) = 1 , (16)
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while
I(A : B ↓ E)ρ = I(A : B ↓↓ E)(a)ρ = 2 , (17)
for a = 1, 2. In general, for tripartite pure states, squashed entanglement is a tighter bound on
the key rate than the intrinsic information by at least a factor of two:
2Esq(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE) = I(A : B ↓ E)|ψ〉〈ψ| . (18)
3.3.2 The locking effect
We will now give a concrete example which shows that there is a purification |ψ〉AA′BB′E of ρABE
such that
KD(ρABE) = ER(ρAA′BB′) < I(AA
′ : BB′ ↓ E)ρ . (19)
Consider the distribution pijkl defined by the following distribution for pij
i 0 1 2 3
j
0 18
1
8 0 0
1 18
1
8 0 0
2 0 0 14 0
3 0 0 0 14
and where k and l are uniquely determined by (i, j),
k = i+ j(mod 2) for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (20)
k = i(mod 2) for i ∈ {2, 3} (21)
l = ⌊i/2⌋ (22)
for all (i, j) with pij > 0. We denote the corresponding cccc state by
ρABEF =
∑
ijkl
pijkl|ijkl〉〈ijkl| . (23)
Clearly KD(ρA;B;EF ) = 0, as Eve can factorise Alice and Bob, by keeping k when l = 1 and
forgetting it when l = 0. In the former case, when l = 0, then Alice and Bob have (i, j) = (2, 2),
and when l = 1, then Alice and Bob have (i, j) = (3, 3). In the latter case, both Alice and Bob
have at random 0 or 1 and they are not correlated.
On the other hand, when Eve does not have access to l, then the key rate is equal to 1, i.e.,
KD(ρA;B;E)=1. Indeed, it cannot be greater, as key cannot increase more than the entropy of
the variable that was taken out from Eve. However one finds that the intrinsic information is
equal to 3/2, i.e., I(A : B ↓ E)ρ = 3/2 [7].
Let us consider the purification of the above state,
|ψA′ABEF 〉 = 1
2
(|0〉A′ |22〉AB|0〉E |0〉F + |0〉A′ |33〉AB|1〉E |0〉F (24)
+|ψ〉A′AB|0〉E |1〉F + |φ〉A′AB|1〉E |1〉F
)
,
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where
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A′ |00〉AB + |1〉A′ |11〉AB) (25)
and
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A′ |01〉AB + |1〉A′ |10〉AB) . (26)
Thus when E and F are with Eve, the state ρAA′;B of Alice and Bob is a mixture of four states:
|0〉|22〉, |0〉|33〉, |φ〉 and |ψ〉. This state is separable state, hence ER(ρAA′;B) = 0.
Consider now the state ρAA′F ;B where F is controlled by Alice instead of Eve. Measuring F
makes the state separable and in [32] it was shown that measuring a single qubit cannot decrease
the relative entropy of entanglement by more than 1, thus we obtain
ER(ρAA′F ;B) ≤ 1 . (27)
By Theorem 3.11 we then have KD(ρABE) ≤ 1, but indeed one can distil one bit of key from
ρABE , therefore
KD(ρABE) = ER(ρAA′F ;B) = 1 . (28)
In [7] the considered distribution was generalised to make the gap between intrinsic information
and distillable key arbitrarily large. It is not difficult to see that ER is still bounded by one.
This shows that the bound based on relative entropy of entanglement, though perhaps more
complicated in use, can be significantly stronger than intrinsic information bound. We leave
it open, whether or not the intrinsic information bound is weaker in general when compared
to the relative entropy bound. This parallels the challenge to discover a relation between the
relative entropy of entanglement and squashed entanglement. Here it has also been observed that
squashed entanglement can exceed the relative entropy of entanglement by a large amount, due
to a locking effect [33].
3.4 Upper and lower bounds when ρABE = ρAB ⊗ ρE
In this section we focus on states of the form ρABE = ρAB ⊗ ρE . Since distillable key cannot
increase under Eve’s operations, the form of the state ρE is not important and we conclude that
KD(ρAB⊗ρE) is a function of ρAB only. If the state ρAB is classical on system A, then it is known
that distillable key is equal to the quantum mutual information, KD(ρAB ⊗ ρE) = I(A : B)ρ
[10]. Indeed, we know from Theorem 3.5 that the key rate can never exceed I(A : B)ρ. For
separable quantum states ρAB we were able to further improve this bound. The upper bounds
are summarised in the following theorem, whose proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.12. For all states ρAB ⊗ ρE,
KD(ρAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ I(A : B)ρ (29)
with equality if ρAB is classical on system A. If ρAB is separable, i.e., ρAB =
∑
i piρ
i
A⊗ρiB, then
KD(ρAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ ILOPCacc (E) ≤ Iacc(E) (30)
where E = {pi, ρiA ⊗ ρiB} and ILOPCacc (E) is the maximal mutual information that Alice and Bob
can obtain about i using LOPC operations (see e.g. [34, 35]), whereas Iacc(E) denotes the usual
accessible information, i.e. maximal mutual information about i obtained by joint measurements.
We will now derive a general lower bound on the key rate in terms of the distillable common
randomness.
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Definition 3.13. We say that an LOPC protocol P distills common randomness at rate RP if
there exists a sequence {ℓn}n∈N such that
lim sup
n→∞
ℓn −mn
n
= RP (31)
lim
n→∞
‖Λn(ρ⊗nAB)− τ ℓn‖ = 0 (32)
where mn is the number of communicated bits. The distillable common randomness of a state
ρAB is defined as DR(ρAB) := supP RP .
For some protocols the rate may be negative. However it is immediate that DR(ρAB) is
nonnegative for all ρAB. The following statement is a direct consequence of the results in [10, 11].
Theorem 3.14. For the states ρABE = ρAB ⊗ ρE the distillable key is an upper bound on the
distillable common randomness, i.e., KD(ρAB ⊗ ρE) ≥ DR(ρAB) for all ρAB and ρE.
4 Embedding classical into quantum states
The problem of distilling key from a classical tripartite distribution (i.e., ccc states) is closely
related to the problem of distilling entanglement from a bipartite quantum state (where the
environment takes the role of the adversary), as noted in [9, 7]. It thus seems natural to ask
whether, in analogy to bound entangled quantum states (which have positive entanglement cost
but zero distillable entanglement), there might be classical distributions with bound information.
These are distributions with zero key rate but positive key cost, i.e., no key can be distilled from
them, yet key is needed to generate them. The existence of such distributions, however, is still
unproved. (There are, however, some partial positive answers, including an asymptotic result [7]
as well as a result for scenarios involving more than three parties [36].)
In [9, 7], it has been suggested that the classical distribution obtained by measuring bound
entangled quantum states might have bound information. Such hope, however, was put into
question by the results of [15], showing that there are quantum states with positive key rate but
no distillable entanglement (i.e., they are bound entangled). However, the examples of states put
forward in [15] have a rather special structure. It is thus still possible that distributions with
bound information might be obtained by measuring appropriately chosen bound entangled states.
In the following, we consider a special embedding of classical distributions into quantum states
as proposed in [9]. We then show how statements about key distillation starting from the original
state and from the embedded state are related to each other. Let
ρccc :=
∑
ijk
pijk|ijk〉〈ijk|ABE (33)
be a ccc state defined relative to fixed orthonormal bases on the three subsystems (in the following
called computational bases). We then consider the qqq embedding ρqqq = |ψ〉〈ψ| of ρccc given by
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
√
pijk|ijk〉ABE . (34)
Note that, if Alice and Bob measure ρqqq in the computational basis, they end up with a state of
the form
ρccq =
∑
ij
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ |ψij〉〈ψij |E (35)
for some appropriately chosen |ψij〉. We call this state the ccq embedding of ρccc.
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In a similar way as classical distributions can be translated to quantum states, classical proto-
cols have a quantum analogue. To make this more precise, we consider a classical LOPC protocol
P that Alice and Bob wish to apply to a ccc state ρccc as in (33). Obviously, P can equivalently
be applied to the corresponding ccq embedding ρccq as defined in (35) (because Alice and Bob’s
parts are the same in both cases). Because Eve might transform the information she has in the
ccq case to the information she has in the ccc case by applying a local measurement, security of
the key generated by P when applied to ρccq immediately implies security of the key generated
by P when applied to ρccc. Note, however, that the opposite of this statement is generally not
true.
In general, a classical protocol P can be subdivided into a sequence of steps of the following
form:
1. generating local randomness
2. forgetting information (discarding local subsystems)
3. applying permutations
4. classical communication.
The coherent version of P , denoted Pq, is defined as the protocol acting on a qqq state where
the above classical operations are replaced by the following quantum operations:
1. attaching subsystems which are in a superposition of fixed basis vectors
2. transferring subsystems to Eve
3. applying unitary transformations that permute fixed basis vectors
4. adding ancilla systems (with fixed initial state) to both the receiver’s and Eve’s system,
and applying controlled not (CNOT) operations to both ancillas, where the CNOTs are
controlled by the communication bits.
Consider now a fixed ccc state ρccc of the form (33) and let P be a classical protocol acting
on ρccc. It is easy to see that the following operations applied to the qqq embedding ρqqq of ρccc
result in the same state: (i) measuring in the computational basis and then applying the classical
protocol P ; or (ii) applying the coherent protocol Pq and then measuring the resulting state γℓ
in the computational basis. This fact can be expressed by a commutative diagram.
|ψ〉〈ψ|⊗n Pq−−−−→ γℓ
measurement
y ymeasurement
ρ⊗nccq
P−−−−→ τ ℓ
(36)
Hence, if the coherent version Pq of P acting on ρqqq distills secure key bits at rate R then so
does the protocol P applied to the original ccc state ρccc.
It is natural to ask whether there are cases for which the converse of this statement holds as
well. This would mean that security of a classical protocol also implies security of its coherent
version. In the following, we exhibit a class of distributions for which this is always true. The
key rate of any such distribution is thus equal to the key rate of the corresponding embedded qqq
state.
Roughly speaking, the class of distributions we consider is characterised by the property that
the information known to Eve is completely determined by the joint information held by Alice
and Bob.
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Theorem 4.1. Let ρccc be a ccc state of the form (33) such that, for any pair of values (i, j)
held by Alice and Bob there exists at most one value k of Eve with pijk > 0. If a classical protocol
P applied to ρccc produces key at rate R then so does its coherent version Pq applied to the qqq
embedding |ψ〉 of ρccc (and followed by a measurement in the computational basis).
Proof. The ccq embedding of ρccc is given by a state of the form
ρccq =
∑
ij
pij |ij〉〈ij|AB ⊗ |ψij〉〈ψij |E . (37)
Since, by assumption, every pair (i, j) determines a unique k = k(i, j), |ψij〉〈ψij |E equals
|k(i, j)〉〈k(i, j)| and, hence, ρccq is identical to the original ccc state ρccc. The assertion then
follows from the fact that measurements in the computational basis applied to Alice and Bob’s
subsystems commute with the coherent version Pq of P .
Corollary 4.2. Let ρccc be a ccc state of the form (33) such that, for any pair of values (i, j)
held by Alice and Bob there exists at most one value k of Eve with pijk > 0. Then, the key rate
for the qqq embedding ρqqq of ρccc satisfies
KD(ρqqq) = KD(ρccc) . (38)
Note that the above statements do not necessarily hold for general distributions. To see this,
consider the state
|ψ〉ABA′E = |00〉AB|+〉A′ |+〉E + |11〉AB|ψ+〉A′E (39)
where |+〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and |ψ+〉 := 1√2 (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉). Moreover, let ρccc be the ccc state
obtained by measuring |ψ〉〈ψ|AA′;B;E in the computational basis. Because all its coefficient are
positive, it is easy to verify that |ψ〉〈ψ|ABA′E can be seen as the qqq embedding of ρccc. Observe
that, after discarding subsystem A′, ρccc corresponds to a perfect key bit. However, the ccq state
obtained from |ψ〉〈ψ|ABA′E by discarding A′ and measuring in the computational basis is of the
form 12 (|00〉〈00|AB ⊗ |+〉〈+|E + |11〉〈11|AB ⊗ IE/2). This state, of course, does not correspond to
a key bit as Eve might easily distinguish the states |+〉〈+| and IE/2.
We continue with a statement on the relation between the intrinsic information of a ccc state
and the so-called entanglement of formation6 EF of its qqq embedding. More precisely, we show
that, under the same condition as in Theorem 4.1, the first is a lower bound for the latter (see
also [38, 39]).
Theorem 4.3. Let ρccc be a ccc state of the form (33) such that, for any pair of values (i, j)
held by Alice and Bob there exists at most one value k of Eve with pijk > 0, and let ρqqq be the
qqq embedding of this state. Then
I(A : B ↓ E)ρccc ≤ EF (TrE(ρqqq)) . (40)
Proof. Note first that any decomposition of TrE(ρqqq) into pure states can be induced by an
appropriate measurement on the system E. Hence, we have
EF (TrE(ρqqq)) = min
{|k¯}〉
∑
k¯
pk¯S(A)|ψk¯〉 (41)
where the minimum ranges over all families of (not necessarily normalised) vectors |k¯〉 such
that
∑
k¯ |k¯〉〈k¯| = IE (this ensures that they form a measurement), pk¯ := |〈k¯|E |ψ〉ABE |2, and
|ψk¯〉 := 〈k¯|E |ψ〉ABE/√pk¯.
6The entanglement of formation EF is an entanglement measure defined for bipartite states by EF (σAB) :=
min
P
i
piS(TrB(σ
i
AB
)) where the minimum is taken over all ensembles {pi, σ
i
AB
} with
P
i
piσ
i
AB
= σAB [37].
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For any pair (i, j) of values held by Alice and Bob (with nonzero probability) we have
TrAB [ρqqq (|ij〉〈ij| ⊗ IE)] = pij |k〉〈k|, where k = k(i, j) is the corresponding (unique) value held
by Eve. Hence, the probability distribution of the state ρ¯ccc obtained by applying the above
measurement on Eve’s system satisfies
qijk¯ := Tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE |ijk¯〉〈ijk¯|) = pijkqk¯|k , (42)
where qk¯|k := Tr(|k¯〉〈k¯||k〉〈k|). The intrinsic information is thus bounded by
I(A : B ↓ E)ρccc ≤ min{|k¯〉} I(A : B|E¯)ρ¯ccc , (43)
where ρ¯ccc is the state defined above (depending on the choice of the vectors |k¯〉). Moreover,
using Holevo’s bound, we find
I(A : B|E¯)ρ¯ccc ≤ min{|k¯}〉
∑
k¯
pk¯S(A)|ψk¯〉 . (44)
The assertion then follows from (41).
Because the intrinsic information is additive (i.e., it is equal to its regularised version), The-
orem 4.3 also holds if the entanglement of formation EF is replaced by the entanglement cost
EC .
The discussion above suggests that classical key distillation from ccc states can indeed by
analysed by considering the corresponding qqq embedding of the state, but the original ccc state
has to satisfy certain properties. This relation might be particularly useful for the study of bound
information as discussed at the beginning of this section. In fact, there exist bound entangled
states which satisfy the property required by Theorem 4.1 above [40].
5 On locking and pre-shared keys
In [7] it was observed that, by adding one bit of information to Eve, the (classical) intrinsic infor-
mation can decrease by an arbitrarily large amount. In [16] it was shown that classical correlation
measures of quantum states can exhibit a similar behaviour; more precisely, the accessible infor-
mation can drop by an arbitrarily large amount when a single bit of information is lost. This
phenomenon has been named locking of information or just locking. For tripartite states ρABE ,
locking comes in two flavours: i) locking caused by removing information from Eve, ii) locking
caused by removing information from Alice and/or Bob (and possibly giving it to Eve). Let us
call those variants E-locking and AB-locking, respectively.
In [32] it was shown that entanglement cost as well as many other entanglement measures can
be AB-locked. Further results show that squashed entanglement and entanglement of purification
are also AB-lockable [33, 41]. So far the only known non-lockable entanglement measure is relative
entropy of entanglement.
It was shown in [7] that distillable key is not E-lockable for classical states. In the sequel we
extend this result and prove that the distillable key for quantum states ρABE is not E-lockable,
either. The proof proceeds along the lines of [7], replacing the bound of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner by
its quantum generalisations due to [10] (see also [11]). Let us emphasise that we leave open the
question on whether distillable key is AB-lockable (even for ccc states).
Theorem 5.1. Consider a state ρABEE′ and let P be a key distillation protocol for ρABE with
rate RP . Then there exists another protocol P ′ for ρABEE′ with rate RP′ ≥ RP − 2S(ρE′). If, in
addition, E′ is classical then RP′ ≥ RP − S(ρE′).
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Proof. For any fixed ǫ > 0 there exists n ∈ N such that the protocol P transforms ρ⊗nABE into a
ccq state σABE which satisfies the following inequalities:
‖σABE − τ ℓ‖ ≤ ǫ, ℓ
n
≥ RP − ǫ. (45)
Suppose that Alice and Bob apply this map to the state ρ⊗nABEE′ (i.e., they try to distil key, as if
the system E′ was not present). The state ρ⊗nABEE′ is then transformed into some state σABEE′
which traced out over E′ is equal to the ccq state σABE . Repeating this protocol m times results
in σ⊗mABEE′ , from which Alice and Bob can draw at least m(I(A : B) − I(A : EE′)) − o(m) bits
of key by error correction and privacy amplification [10]. This defines a protocol P ′. To evaluate
its rate, we use subadditivity of entropy which gives the estimate
I(A : EE′)σ ≤ I(A : E)σ + I(AE : E′)σ . (46)
From (45) and the conditional version of Fannes’ inequality [28] we know that, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1],7
I(A : B)σ − I(A : E)σ ≥ (1− 8ǫ)ℓ− 4H(ǫ) . (47)
This together with (6) implies
KD(σABEE′) ≥ I(A : B)σ − I(A : EE′)σ ≥ (1− 8ǫ)ℓ− 4H(ǫ)− I(AE : E′)σ . (48)
To get the key rate of P ′, we divide the above by n and use (45),
RP′ ≥ 1
n
KD(σABEE′) ≥ (1− 8ǫ)(RP − ǫ)− 1
n
4H(ǫ)− 1
n
I(AE : E′)σ . (49)
Because this holds for any ǫ > 0, the assertion follows from I(AE : E′)σ ≤ 2S(E′)σ = 2nS(E′)ρ
and, if E′ is classical, I(AE : E′)σ ≤ S(E′)σ = nS(E′)ρ.
Applying the above theorem to an optimal protocol leads to the statement that the key rate
KD is not E-lockable.
Corollary 5.2. For any state ρABEE′ , KD(ρABEE′) ≥ KD(ρABE) − 2S(ρE′) and, if E′ is
classical, KD(ρABEE′) ≥ KD(ρABE)− S(ρ′E).
Consider now a situation where Alice and Bob have some pre-shared key U which is not known
to Eve.
A major consequence of Theorem 5.1 is that a pre-shared key cannot be used as a catalyst to
increase the key rate. More precisely, the corollary below implies that, for any protocol P that
uses a pre-shared key held by Alice and Bob, there is another protocol P ′ which is as efficient as
P ′ (with respect to the net key rate), but does not need a pre-shared key.
Corollary 5.3. Let P be a key distillation protocol for ρABE ⊗ τ ℓ where τ ℓ is some additional
ℓ-bit key shared by Alice and Bob. Then there exists another protocol P ′ for ρABE with rate
RP′ ≥ RP − ℓ.
Proof. Consider the state ρA′B′EE′ where E
′ is a system containing the value U of a uniformly
distributed ℓ-bit key, A′ := (A,U), and B′ := (B,U). Note that ρA′B′E is equivalent to ρABE⊗τ ℓ.
The assertion then follows from the observation that any protocol which produces a secure key
starting from ρA′B′EE′ can easily be transformed into an (equally efficient) protocol which starts
from ρABE , because Alice and Bob can always generate public shared randomness.
7H(ǫ) denotes the binary entropy, i.e., the Shannon entropy of the distribution [ǫ, 1− ǫ].
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The following example shows that the factor 2 in Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2 is strictly
necessary. Let
ρABEE′ =
4∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|A ⊗ |i〉〈i|B ⊗ |ψi〉〈ψi|EE′ (50)
where |ψi〉 are the four Bell states on the bipartite system EE′. Then, obviously, KD(ρABEE′) =
0, but if E′ (which is only one qubit) is lost, then KD(ρABE) = 2, since E is then maximally
mixed conditioned on i. One recognises here the effect of superdense coding.
6 Classical and quantum adversaries in QKD
Up to now, we have considered an adversary with unbounded resources. Of course, if one limits
the adversary’s capabilities, certain cryptographic tasks might become easier. In the following,
we will examine a situation where the adversary cannot store quantum states and, hence, is
forced to apply a measurement, turning them into classical data. We will exhibit an example of
a 2d-dimensional ccq state which only has key rate 1, but if Eve is forced to measure her system,
the key rate raises up to roughly 12 log d.
Note that upper bounds on the key rate which are defined in terms of an optimal measurement
on Eve’s system (see, e.g., [26, 19] and Section 3) are also upper bounds on the key rate in a
setting where Eve has no quantum memory. Hence, our result implies that these upper bounds
are generally only rough estimates for the key rate in the unbounded scenario.
Consider the state
ρAA′BB′E =
1
2d
d∑
k=1
|00〉〈00|AB(|kk〉〈kk|A′B′ ⊗ |k〉〈k|E)
+ |11〉〈11|AB(|kk〉〈kk|A′B′ ⊗ U |k〉〈k|E |U †) (51)
where U is the quantum Fourier transform on d dimensions. (Such a state has been proposed
in [16] to exhibit a locking effect of the accessible information. It also corresponds to the flower
state of [32].)
It is easy to see that the bit in the system AB is uncorrelated to Eve’s information and, hence,
completely secret, i.e., KD(ρAA′BB′E) = KD(ρAB) ≥ 1. On the other hand, if this bit is known
to Eve then she has full knowledge on the state in A′B′, i.e., KD(ρAA′BB′EE′) ≤ I(AA′ : BB′ ↓
EE′)ρ = 0, where E′ is a classical system carrying the value of the bit in AB (see Theorem 3.5).
From this and Corollary 5.2 (or, alternatively, Theorem 3.9), we conclude that the key rate
(relative to an unbounded adversary) is given by
KD(ρAA′BB′E) = KD(ρAB) = 1 . (52)
Let us now assume that Eve applies a measurement on her system E, transforming the state
defined above into a ccc state σAA′BB′E . Because the values of Alice and Bob are maximally
correlated, it is easy to see that the key rate of this state satisfies KD(σAA′BB′E) = S(A|E)σ =
S(A)σ−I(A : E)σ. Note that S(A)σ = 1+log d. Moreover, the mutual information I(A : E)σ for
an optimal measurement on E corresponds to the so-called accessible information, which equals
1
2 log d, as shown in [16]. We thus conclude that
KD(σAA′BB′E) = 1 +
1
2
log d . (53)
Note that the accessible information is additive, so even if the measurements are applied to blocks
of states, the amount of key that can be generated is given by this expression.
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The above result gives some insights into the strength of attacks considered in the context of
quantum key distribution (QKD). A so-called individual attack corresponds to a situation where
the adversary transforms his information into classical values. In contrast, a collective attack is
more general and allows the storage of quantum states.
As shown in [18], for most QKD protocols, security against collective attacks implies security
against any attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. The above result implies that the
same is not true for individual attacks, i.e., these might be arbitrarily weaker than collective (and,
hence, also general) attacks.
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A On the definition of the key rate
The following lemma achieves a simplification of the definition of distillable key KD (Defini-
tion 2.2).
Lemma A.1. The maximisation in the definition of KD can be restricted to protocols that use
communication at most linear in the number of copies of ρABE.
Proof. Let {Λn}n∈N be a key distillation protocol with rate R and with communication not
necessarily linear in n. Fix ǫ > 0. Then there exists an n0 such that
||Λn0(ρ⊗n0ABE)− τ
ℓn0
ABE ||1 ≤ ǫ (54)
and
ℓn0
n0
≥ R − ǫ. Consider now key distillation from many copies of σABE := Γ(Λn0(ρ⊗n0ABE)),
where Γ is a measurement of Alice and Bob in their computational bases. We can limit the
dimension of Alice’s and Bob’s system to 2ℓn0 , because any additionally appearing symbols could
be mapped, for instance, to the symbol 1. This allows us to bound the difference in the mutual
informations with help of a conditional version of Fannes’ inequality [28],
I(A : B)σ − I(A : E)σ ≥ (1− 8ǫ)ℓn0 − 4H(ǫ) , (55)
which holds if ǫ ≤ 1. Alice and Bob can achieve the rate I(A : B)σ − I(A : E)σ using communi-
cation linear in the number of copies of σABE , since σABE is evidently a ccq state [10, 11]. We
have therefore modified the protocol {Λn}n∈N achieving a rate R into a protocol {Λ˜n}n∈N with a
rate
R˜ ≥ (1 − 8ǫ)(R− ǫ)− 4H(ǫ)
n0
. (56)
The amount of communication in this protocol is proportional to the number of copies of ρABE .
Since ǫ was arbitrary we obtain a sequence of protocols (each with communication linear in the
number of copies ρAB) which approaches the rate R.
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B Proof of Theorem 3.5
To show that the intrinsic information is an upper bound on the key rate, it suffices to verify that
it satisfies the requirements of Theorem 3.1. We start by proving monotonicity of I(A : B|E′)
under LOPC operations.
Monotonicity. Local operations, i.e., operations on either Alice’s or Bob’s side, consist of
adding a local ancilla system, applying a local unitary transformation and removing a local
subsystem. The two first operations leave I(A : B|E′) constant. So we have to show that
I(A : B|E′) does not increase under partial trace, i.e. I(A : B′|E′) ≤ I(A : B′B′′|E′). This
follows immediately from chain rule and the positivity of the quantum mutual information:
I(A : B′|E′) = I(A : B′B′′|E′)− I(A : B′′|E′B′) ≤ I(A : B′B′′|E′). (57)
Public communication from Alice to Bob is the process where a classical register C is copied to
both Bob and Eve. This can be done in two steps. First, two copies C′ and C′′ of C are created
locally on Alice’s side, hence I(ACC′C′′;B|E′) = I(AC;B|E′). Second, Alice hands over C′
to Eve and C′′ to Bob. In order to conclude that the conditional mutual information is non-
increasing under public communication, it therefore suffices to show that I(AC;BC′′|C′E′) ≤
I(ACC′C′′;B|E′). Writing it out in terms of entropies, the claim is
S(ACC′E′) + S(BC′C′′E′)− S(C′E′) ≤ S(ACC′C′′E′) + S(BE′)− S(E′) (58)
which is equivalent to
S(ACE′) + S(BCE′)− S(CE′) ≤ S(ACE′) + S(BE′)− S(E′) (59)
since C′ and C′′ are copies of C. Eliminating the term S(ACE′) we see that the claim is true by
strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy.
Since the statement holds for arbitrary channels, it also holds for the intrinsic information.
Asymptotic continuity. Let ||ρABE −σABE ||1 ≤ ǫ. Since the trace distance is non-increasing
under CPTP maps we find ||ρABE′ − σABE′ ||1 ≤ ǫ, where ρABE′ = (IAB ⊗ ΛE→E¯)(ρABE) and
σABE′ = (IAB ⊗ ΛE→E¯)(σABE). By the conditional version of Fannes’ inequality we find
|I(A : B|E′)ρ − I(A : B|E′)σ| ≤ 8ǫ log dA + 4H(ǫ) . (60)
Since the statement holds for arbitrary channels, it also holds for the intrinsic information.
Normalisation. This property can be verified by inserting τABE into the definition of the
intrinsic information.
Subadditivity. We first prove additivity on tensor products for the mutual information:
I(A1A2 : B1B2|E′1E′2) = I(A1 : B1|E′1E′2) + I(A1 : B2|E′1E′2B1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(61)
+ I(A2 : B2|E′1E′2A1) + I(A2 : B1|E′1E′2A1B2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= I(A1 : B1|E′1) + I(A2 : B2|E′2) (62)
where the last inequality follows by the independence of ρA1B1E′1 and ρA2B2E′2 . Subadditivity for
the intrinsic information follows from the observation that the infimum in the definition includes
product channels.
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C Proof of Theorem 3.12
The statement KD(ρAB ⊗ ρE) ≤ I(A : B) follows from the intrinsic information bound. The
equality condition is a consequence of (6).
To prove the second part of the theorem, we view ρAB as the partial state of a tripartite state
ρABD =
∑
i
pi|i〉D〈i| ⊗ ρ(i)A ⊗ ρ(i)B (63)
where D is a classical register. Consider a key distillation protocol for the state ρAB with rate R.
For the map on n copies of the state, let C be the overall communication and let A′ and B′ denote
the classical keys generated by Alice and Bob, respectively. The definition of the key rate implies
that I(A′ : B′|C)/n converges to R. It is our goal to find an upper bound for I(A′ : B′|C).
Note that I(A′ : B′|CD) = 0 since the only correlations between Alice and Bob come from D
and from communication. Thus from the chain rule we get I(A′ : B′D|C) = I(A′ : D|C) so that
I(A′ : B′|C) ≤ I(A′ : D|C) = I(A′C : D|C) ≤ I(A′B′C : D). (64)
The r.h.s. is a lower bound for the LOPC-accessible information of n copies of the ensemble E .
However LOPC-accessible information is additive if its members are separable [42]. Thus we
obtain
ILOPCacc ({pi, ρiA ⊗ ρiB}) ≥
1
n
I(A′ : B′|C)→R . (65)
Of course Iacc is by definition not smaller than I
LOPC
acc . This concludes the proof since the above
for any protocol.
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